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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SOUTHEAST FURNITURE and
ST A TJ1J INSURANCE FTTND,
Plaintiff s-AppeUants,

vs.

Case No.
11816

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and DEAN L. BARRETT,
Def enrhmts-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NA'PURE OF
'rhis action is based upon a claim by defendant,
Dean L. Barrett, for compensation for injuries sustained
in the course of his employment, pursnant to the provisions of Title 35, Chaptf'r 1, \Vorkmen's Compensation.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 'rHE
TNDTTSTRIAL
The Industrial Commi:'lsion concluded that "the
applicant [was] entitled to workmen's compensation
henefits as a result of an accidf'nt arising out of or in
the course of his employment hy the [Plaintiff South East
Furniture Company]."

2
RELIFJF 80UGH11 ON APPEAL
The Defendant submits that the ruling of the Indm;trial Commission should he affirnwd.

On November 10, 1966, defendant Barrett was driving his automobile in the Yicinity of Tooele, Ptah, pursuant to his l:'mployment with plaintiff, 8onth East Furniture. At about the hour of 10 :80 o'clock A.l\I. Barrett's
automohih" was invol\'Pd in an accifh·nt with anothPr antomohilt>, which accident was determint>d not to he his
fault. (R. 12G) As a rt>snlt of the accident, Barrett suffered extl:'nsi\'e neck injuries and abrasion and pmwtnn•
wounds. (R. 1, R.
R. 12G)
Barn_.tt suhsequf'ntly fi lt>d a claim for workmen's
eorn1wnsation. ( R. 8) rrlw Stat<-> TnsnrancP Fund, whie11
was tl1<->
orknwn 's Compensation 1nsnrauc(' carriPr of
BarrPtf s employer, paid nwdical <'Xpf'nsPs in tlw amonnt
of $271.00 and corn1wnsation in the amount of $:3+G.25
(R. 10), hut denif'd additional
on the gronrnl
that Barr<->tt was covt•red hy uninsured motorists' coverag-e on his privat<· antomohile insnrancP poli<'y. (R. 8)

'y

On Decernhf'r 27, 1967, rnorP than om· year snhsPq1wnt to the date of tlw aceidPnt, and only aftc-'r dt•nial
of additional liability hy the 8tatP InsurancP Fund, and
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only after having unavoidably incurred some $1,364.59
in special damages and lost wages of $1,385.79 (R. 82),
Barrett settled his claim based upon the uninsured automobile coverage with State Farm Insurance Company.
(R. 96)
The neck injury he sustained being a continuing disability, Barrett then, on January 22, 1968, applied for
a hearing to settle the industrial accident claim. (R. 8)
His application was granted (R. 11), and the hearing
was held April 10, 1968. (R. 15)
At the hearing Barrett testified to facts regarding
his employment which tended to indicate that he was an
(·mployee of plaintiff South East Furniture. (R. 18 to 23)
:Mr. Barrett furtlwr testified to the injuries he sustained,
indicating neck, ehest and arm injuries. (R. 25) The
reeord shows (R. 26) that Barrett had received no corn}>(,rn:;ation from the other d11vf>r for the injuries. (R. 27)
An insurance policy secured and paid for by him
(R. 26) included, among other provisions, "Uninsured
Antomohile Coverage." (R. 89, State Farm :Mutual
Automofole Policy, at page 5 thereof. CoYerage F.)
The Referee held the decision of the commission in
ahPyance pending submission of various do<>nments, ineluding hriefs of connsf>l, hut indicated that "the question
of law should hP resolved primarily," (R. 71), whether
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the applicant could recover Workmen's Compensation
benefits in addition to the settlement under the uninsured
Automobile Coverage. (R. 76, R. 114, R. 127)
l'"'ollmving submission of Applicant's Brief (R. 75 to
82) on April 10, 1968, and Defendant's Memorandum
(R. 113 to 122) on September 24, 1968, the Industrial
Commission, on June 3, 1969, entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R. 126 to

T1w Commission concluded "that the Applicant

129)

[was] entitled to he compensated for hi:; losses under
the eompensation act notwithstanding any s<->ttlement
reached on the insnranC'P in question." (R. 128)
Whereupon. this appt>al was takl-'n.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT WAS ENTITLED
TO

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

NOTWITHSTANDING

BENEFITS

ANY CONTRACTUAL RE-

COVERY HE MAY HAVE HAD UNDER THE UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE COVERAGE PROVISION OF
HIS PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY.
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The plaintiff State Insurance Fund denied liability
beyond the $617.25 originally allowed Barrett on the
ground that Barrett's private insurer, State Farm Mutnal, stood in the shoes of the tortfeasor whose acts resulted in injury to Barrett. On the basis of this position,
the plaintiff concluded that State Farm Mutual was a
third-party within the meaning of 35-1-62, Ptah Code
Annotated, 1953, and therefore a
against whom
the plaintiffs became trustees of the cause of action.
Since respondent had previously settled with State Farm
on the basis of uninsured automobile covt•rage, plaintiff
Insurance Fund felt that it had bPen thereby foreclosed from pursuing the action against the thirty party
tort f Pasor.
Plaintiff asserts to this court that Section 41-12-21.1
li.C.A., 1953, as amended, sets forth the ma11datory relinirernPnt that all automobile liability policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage. (Plaintiff's Brief at G)
Plaintiff argnes from that point that Barrett is in no
(lifferent position, and has obtained no "different type
of coverage than other drivrrs on onr publie highways."
(Plaintiff's Brief at 6) Plaintiff's assertion reasonably
states the correct langnage of the provision - so far as
it goes. Plaintiff's studied omission of th<' language of
the last sentence of that section cannot Pscape notice:
"Tht-> named insnred shall haw the right to
re jt>ct sneh eovPrage, and unless thP named insured requests snch con•rage in writing, such
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coverage need not be provided in a rene\\ral policy
or a snpplernent to it
the named insured
had rejected thP coveragt' in connection with a
policy previously issued to him by the same msurer." 4-1-12-21.1 F.C.A., 195i1 as anwnded.
Read with the preceding portion of the stat<-'ment,
tl1is sentence clearly renders the requireHwnt of uninsured
motorist coverage permissive - it must be offered, but
it need not be accepted. In addition, it need not even beoffered "in a n•newal policy or a suPlilement." l\ilandaBarrett frf'ely and
rontracted and
paid for uninsured motorist's rovPrag-e. His rig·hts with
res1w«t to thP poliey WPl'P er ('111/fratfu. not e.r rlelirto.
Anotht>r court has eonsidPrPd tlH, legal relation of
an insnred and insnrt,r insofar as nninsured motorist
rov<>rage is concPrnPd. 111 Booth r. Fireman·.-: Fiuul 111 ...;.
Co., 25:1 La. G:21, 218 So.2d 580, 28 ALR :1d, f>7:1 09()9),
thr ronrt disrnssed sueh eoverag-<> and its interpretation
in otlie r jurisdirtions:
·· ln an pffort to afford protection to tlw innot>Pnt yirtim injm·pd by an nninsm·Pd and finan<·ially irrPsponsihle rnotorist, many states havP
Pnad(-'<l legislation n,qniring· insnrmH'(' eornpc.rni(':-:
to afford ro\·eraµ;P, fo1· an additional prt>rniurn.
within tl:P gPnPral antoniohilt>
policy for
to tlw imrnn--d oeeasimwd hy tlw
nPgligPnc'P of tlw opt>rator of an nninsnred motor

YPhir\P,"

7
.
jnrisprndence of other states interpretmg snmlar statutes and the insurance coverage
afforded under similar policy provisions has been
nniform in concluding that the action bv the in:mred against his insurer for damages suffered as
a result of a collision wth an uninsured motorist
is cotractual ... " (Citing: Hartford Accide·nt &
Indemnity Co. v. Mason, 210 8o.2d 475 (Fla.);
8chleif v. Hardware Dealer's Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 218 Tn. 489, 404 S.\V.2d 490; DeLw:a L
Motor V Phicle Arcident lndem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d
7(), 268 NY.8. 2d 289, 215 N.E.2d 482; and less('l'
rourts in N PW York StatP)
rrhe con rt sa.id fnrtl!Pl":
'''Phe· unirnrnred motorist provision closely rest'mhlt>s the polici("S of insuranc<' which rPimburse
nn insured for medical Pxpemws or prope1·ty darnug-P rPsnlting- from an antornohilP a<'rfrlPnt ...

'l1lie nninsurPd motorist proyision is not ins11ran('P
or indemnification for the unins!lrPd motorist, and the
insurer does not stand in the shoes of thf' m1i11su.red
motorist who is the tort ffr1sor.'' (rrnphasis added) (Citi11g: Nationwide Mntual Ins. Co. \". Harleysyille
Cas. Co., 125 S.E.2d 840 (\Ta.); J!orn1' r. Superior f,ift'
fnR. Co., 123 SE2d 401 (\'a.); Drewry r. State Fann Jfltt.
-:fotomolJile Ins. Co., 12!) H.I!J.2(1 G81 (Ya.); Laird ·v.
Xatio11wirle [11:;, Co., 134 S.E.2d 20<) (So. C.); Hill I'.
S<'aboard Fire & Marine [118. Co, 374 8\V.2d fiO()
Dominici r. Stntr Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 390
P.2d 806 (Mont.); Ki1:011ar r. Hea/f11, 181 A.:2d G:14 (N.H.)

8

Although the Booth case examined the legal status
of the uninsured motorist coverage for the purpose of
determining which period of limitation of action applied,
the cases last cited were noted for their decisions regarding the point in question: whether such coYerage is contractual or otherwise.

In Commiss£oners of State Ins. Fund v. 1V1£ller, 16()
777 (N.Y. 1957), 79 ALR 2d 1256, the conrt
held "that the compensation carrier had no claim against
the immrance proce-eds nnder a statute giving it a lien
against recoyeriPs from third persons negligently injuring on employee." The court said the insured did not
rec.oyer from the tortfoasor hut r<>ceived payment from
his insurer, whm;e liability was contractual although
hased in part on the
of a third party's tort
liability. Pointing ont that its right to a lien wonld
rPmain unimpaired if tlw insnrPr achieYed a
from the tortf Pasor and that it could pnrsne him if the
and his insurer failPd to ad, the conrt said
the compensation carrier was not Pntitled to the benefit
of any insurance by which thP employee chose to provide
additional protPction at his own expensP.
Pf:'terso11

c. State Farm Jlut. Automobile Ins. Co.,

P.2d G51 (On'.) examined among other things, "tlw
lt>gislati \'e imrpose in creating tompulsory uninsured
motorist r.overage," as not('d in plaintiffs hrid at pag-P 8.
(emphasis added) In holding that thP lrnmranee Colllmissioner had no authority to appron· uninsured motor-

9
ist coverage provisions which reduced the insurer's liability by the amount paid to the insured a.s workmen's
compensation benefits, the· court said:
"The common law is clear that an injured
party cannot recover his total damages from each
of two or more tortfeasors. . . . But the common
law regarding recovery of benefits from more
than one source, other than the tortfeasor, is not
so clear. In Cary v. Burris [citation omitted],
we held that the injured plaintiff, a federal employee whose medical expem;es had been paid by
the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, could recover these same expenses from
the defendant tortfeasor. This holding is in acc,-0rd
wdh the law ·i·n most other Jurisdictfons:·
Plaintiff's relianc-P on a friendly varagraph torn
from the context which g-iY(>s it meaning i;.,inorPs thP
conclm:ion of the court in this case-in-point that an Industrial Commission cannot use nnim•m·Pd motorist c-0verage as an excuse for avoiding or rt>dn<'ing payment of
workrnt>n 's compensation ht>nefit:-:.
Plaintiff cites Jones r. Morrison, 284 F. Supp. 1016
(VV.D. Ark. 1968), as supporting his contrntion that paymt>nt h)r an insnrrr pursuant to uninsun><l motorist coverage is t>quivalent to recovrry against a third-party
tortfeasor. In fa.ct, the primary issne pr0sented to the
court was the question of apportionment of liability between two insurance carriers. The emplo)·ee, \vho was
admittt>dl ."T covered hv
. his personal policy of insurance;
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was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist
while driving his employer's car which also v.-as cover('d
by uninsured motorist coverage. Pursuant to a comparative liability statute, the trial court apportioned liability
and found ultimately that the employer was entitled to
$15,000.00 which was to be paid by both insurers. Since
t•ach carrier had identical provisions limiting recovery
under the uninsured motorist coverage to $10,000.00, the
question of apportionment was raised to the appellate
eourt. The court noted that each policy contai1wd i<lentieal ''other insurance" provisions:
'"3. Oth('r lrnmranee: \\'ith rPspeet to

injury to an insured while occupying an antornohile not o"rned hy a nai1wd insured und<•r this
t>ndorsernent, the- immrance lwn•under shall apply
·only as exct>ss insnrance OY<·r an>· similar insuranc•p an1ilahle to sneh ocC'upant. . . . "
1'he JffOYision contimwd with a statt•ment regarding
righh; under uninsured motorist con•rage, providing
generally, that the insurer was liahle only for any liability in excvss of that amount provided hy tlw limits

of the "other insurance," including uninsured motorist

'rhe court cited Appleman, Insurance Law and Praetiee, Yol. 8 Sec. 4914 pp. -1-00-402 for the propo;;ition that
tlw vehicle owner's in:-;urer is primarily
said:

TllP court

ll
"This statement indicates, and the court
agrees, that, as a general rule, the insurance on
the vehicle involved is the primary insurance"
insofar as there is "other insurance."
*
*
*
Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that
[the employer's] uninsured motorist protection
should be exhausted, and [the employee's insurer]
should contribute to that extent necessarv to satisfy the remainder of the judgment
the
nninsnred defendants."
'I'he court Pxamined an aneillary issue:
''AnothPr contention which has been advanced
to the earlier opinion and judgment
is the statement by [the employer's insurer] in
its Motion for Apportionment to the effect that
recovery from the insurance companies by the
plaintiff should be reduced by . . . the amount
paid the plaintiff pursuant to the Workmen's
Compensation Act. . . . [The employee's insurer]
agrees; thP r.ourt, howPvN, does not.
The policies of both [insurers] provide that
the uninsured motorist protection shall not inure
directly or indirectl.v to the be.nefit of any workmen's compensation or liability benefits
. . . The rourt iH of the opinion that to giYe any
effect of this provision would bf' to contravene the
laws of thP State of A
Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 81-1340 provides as follows:
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'Third party liability - (a) Liability unaffected. (1) The making of a claim for
compensation against any employee shall not
affect the right of the employee, or his dependents, to make a claim or maintain an
action in court against any third party for
such injury, but the employer or his carrier
shall be entitled to reasonable notice and
opportUJnity to join in such action.... ' " (emphasis added)
Comparr thf' Arkansas 8tatutr with Utah's 8tatute:
''vVhen
injury or death for which comprnsation is payable under this title shall have
bee-n caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the
injured employee, or in casP of death of his d(•pendants, may claim compensation and the injured
t>mployee or his heirs or personal representative
may have an action for danmges against such
third iwnmn. If compensation is claimed and thP
Pmployer or insuranee carrier becomes obligafod
to pay compensation, the employer or insunrnce
mrrier shall heconw tnudre of the cause of action
ag-ainst the third party.... " ( Pmpliasis
The general intent of the Arkansas statute is not,
as asserted by plaintiff, is not the same as rtah's statute
in regarrl to third party actions.
Utah's legislature has clearly yested an employer or
insurance carrier with rights snptirior to those of the
insured by making the compensation carrier trustfe of
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the cause of action. The Arkansas statute is permissive
in merely entitling the employer or insurance carrier an
"opportunity to JOm in such action." (Ark. Stat. Ann.
Sect. 81-1340(a) (1))
The Jones rourt went on to say:
"The judgment for the plaintiff is against the
third party tortfeasors and, because they are uninsured against the two insurance companies. The
insurance companies are not tortfeasors."
12 Couch on Insurance 2d, Sec. 45-650 at p. 585 was
quoted by the court as saying-:
"The right of subrogation 'against any other
party' given an
against whom a claim
has been made under the workmen's compensation
law does not include the right which an injured
employee has against the insurer under an uninsured motorist provision of a liability policy required by statute, and in view of the public policy
and welfare aspects of the workmen's compensation law the employer's right of subrogation under
such law against the negligent third party is superior to that of the inslfff•r nnder tlw uninsured
motorist law."
The Court noted that the decisions in H orm' i:. Supr?rior Life Ins. Co., 123 S.E. 2d 401 (1962 Va.), and
Commissioners of Statp, Jn.c;. Fund 1'. Miller, 4 App. DiY.
2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777, were supportive of the fore-
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going statement but felt that "part of the op1ruon [in
Horne] is in conflict with the applicable provisions of
the [Arkansas] Workmen's Compensation Act."
The result of this case was that a \Tirginia decision
could not be applied to an Arkansas statute to find that
workmen's compensation payments should be deducted
from the liability of the carriers of the uninsured motorist covt-ragt>.
Horne v. Superior Life Ins. Co., supra, is virtually
on all fours with the instant case. Horne settled with
hi::; immrPr under the terms of uninsured motorist coverage and subsequently executed a ''Policy Holder's Release and r11 rnst Ag-rt>emnt." Horn<" tlwn filed a claim for
workmen's compensation whieh was denied on the ground
that he had destroyed his employer\.; rights of suhrog-ation. The court, at p. 404, met the question head-on:

"The question arises as to whether the right
of subrogation 'against any other party' giv0n the
employer in the [pertinent statute] includes the
rights that the employee has against the insur0r
undH thP uninsured motorist )ll"Ovision of a liability policy whieh is rPquirPd h.\· statnt<>.
Tlw precise issue is onP of first illlpression.
It is not the purpose of the uninsured motorist
law to provide coveragP for tlH· uninsun·d vt>hicle,
but its object is to afford the insured additio1rnl
protection in evt>nt of an accident ( Pmphasis
added). H(•re [the ernployef''s 1nsnrH] does not
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stand in the shoes of ... the uninsured motorist.
Its policy does not insure [the uninsured motorist] against liability. It insures Mrs. Horne and
others protected under the policy against inadequate compensation. [The insurer's] liability to
its insured is contractual, even though it is based
upon the contingency of a third party's tort liability, and Horne's employer ... does not become
a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract. . . . Mrs. Horne chose to provide, at her
expense, additional protection under the uninsured motorist provision for herself and others
protected thereby [sjc] and not for the [employer] or its rompensation rarrier."
Justice Botein concluded similarly, in
of the Stnte Immrance Fiind r. MillPr, supra., that while
"the compensation carrier has a right to expert an injured employee to pursue
rPmedic>s he may
have against a third-party tortfeasor, and if the employee fails to do so, tht> compensation earrier ma.v protert its lien by pursuing his remedies for him ... it has
no right to expect an employe<:> to supplement Jijs common law remedies and protc>rt the compensation rarriers
lien, by purchasing his own insm'l'tneP."
This case, like Horne, sitpra, is substantially
cal to the instant case. Miller claimed \\T orkmen's Compensation benefits and attempted to sue the tortfeasor.
Upon learning that the tortfeasor was an uninsured
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motorist, he made a claim against his insurer pursuant
to uninsured motorist coverage. The State Insurance
Fund asserted a lien on the proceeds to the extent of the
compensation benefits paid.
Meeting the argument of the compensation earner,
the court said:
,,rrhe Fund argues that this makes no difference [that the employee did not recover from the
tortfeasor, but received payment from his owu
insurer], that it has a lien on all tort recoverieF;,
and that the defendant's insurer has agreed to
stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor. Defendant's
insurer cannot, however, be deemed the alter-fgo
of the tort-feasor. It does not insure the tortf easor agai11st liability; it insures its policy holder
against the risk of inadequate compensation for
his c01npe11sable injuries. (emphasis added). Its
liability to defendant is contractual, although
premised in part upon the rontingenry of a third
party's tort liability."
The Horne and Jl;Jiller cases, supra, deciding the
exact question which is before this court, have both concluded that an employee can recover ·workmen's compenbenefits in addition to uninsured motorist coverage benefits; that the benefits
from uninsured
motorist coverage are a contractual obligation of the
insurer; that the insurer does not stan<l in the shoes of
the third party tort feasor; that uninsured motorist covPrage does not inure to the benefit of the compensation
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carrier; that uninsured motorist coverage is contingent
compensation contracted for and paid by the insured to
protect himself from the risk of inadequate compensation
for compensable injuries.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXECUTION OF A RELEASE OF CLAIM IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT'S
INSURER ON THE BASIS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT THEREBY DENIED ITS RIGHT OF RECOVERY AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY.

8Pction 35-1-fi:Z, F.C.A., 1

provides:

"When any injury or deatl1 for which cornnndPr this titlf-' shall have
JW·nsation is
heen eansed h:' thP l\Tongfnl ad or nt'glect of
another pen;on not in thP same
the
injured employt'e, or his lwin; or personal representative may also have an action for damagPs
against snch third penmn. If cornpensati011, is
claimed and the employer or iusurauce carrin·
becomes ol1ligated to pay compensation., the employer or insitrance carrier shall bfconu tnistee
of the crmse of action a.r;ainst tlu third party and
11iay bring and maintain the action, either in its
own name or in the name of tht' injured employee
or his ht'irs or the pt'rsonal rt'presentative of the
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deceased, provided the employer or carrier may
not settle and release the cause of action without
the consent of th0 commission . . . . " (emphasis
added)
This court, per Chief ,Justice Crockett, has recently
construed this section in Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223. Though the
issue was whether the State Insurance Fund was req nired to bear its proportionate share of expenses in
an action brought by an injured employee against a third
party, some general language respPrting the statute is
not inappropriat0:
"'l'he hasic pnrpose of this statute is that of
making an equitable arrangement lwtween an injured ernploye0, and an irnrnrer (or employer)
\\'ho pays him workmen's compensation, with respect to a rausP of action against a third party
\\·ho injnres the employee. It presen·es the action
bnt it prevents him from having
to the
donhle rerovery h>· requiring him to reimburse the
insnrer. ft also gives the insnrc->r th(' right to
bring the action, hut allows it onlv to reimhurse
itself and tlH n pay any halanre to ·tlw 0mplo!'PP."
1

ln this rase, no rerovPry has het>n had against the
tortfeasor -- in faet, n(litlwr the plaintiff nor
fh.fendant has hrought suit against the tortfeasor. D('frndant, in any <'vent, has assigned his owu rans<' of
ad ion to his own immranre rarrier. His rarrier, Rtate
I<"'arrn, now stands in exactly the sanw position as Bar-
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rett stood pnor to the execution of tlw ''Release and
rrrnst Agreement." According to tlw languag-P of lVorthen, supra, either State Farm or the State Insuranc(•
Fund, may bring suit against the third party tortfeasor.
rrhe statnfo might also hf' read morn restrictiyeJy, to
find that since "the employer or insurance carrier shall
brcome trnsteP of thr eanse of artion," (emphasis addrd)
neither the employee nor his assigneP ma>· inde1wndrntly
maintain an action against the third party, the <-'mployee
having once claimed workmen's compensation. The practical result is the same. The State Insurance Fund, in
this case, has either the sole right to maintain an adion,
or the right to join in any action against tlw third party
tort fpasor
upon tliP injury to th(' (•mplo>·ee.

of State !11.-11rrt•l!Cf Fu11d
rrhe romt in
r. Jiiller, supra, arrin•d at the sam<• ronclnsion hased
upon a statute giving the compemmtion rarrif•r a lien
on tlw proreeds of an>· re<>oYer>·:
"In the evPnt that [the Pmployee's] insurer,
acting in [ tlH• timployee's] nanw nnder thP Trnst
Agreement ]Jrovisions of the poliry, suhs<='qnentl>'
achieves a n·eovtiry from th<• tortfc.asor [the cmnpensation
rights to a cornp('nsation lien
tlwrtion remain unimpaired. If [ tlw ernplo>·ep's]
immrer fails to act, the cause of artion against t1w
tortfeasor passes to [thP rornpensation carrier]
opPration of Jm,·. Ahsent any rerov<>ry from
tlw allegt>d wrongdoer, [ thP compPnsation rarrier]
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can lmve no lien on the sums received by the
[employee pursuant to nninsnred motorist coverage-]."
Plaintiff's assertion that the State Insurance Fund
js estopped, or foreclosed, or otherwise denied its right
of suit against the third party tortfeasor "since the
carrier knows the injured employee has assigned aU
right ,title and interest to another entity," is plainly
PIToneons. (emphasis added) N otwi thstandi ng the language of the Release and Trnst Agreement that Barrt-tt
shall "hold in trust for the bem•fit of the company alt
rights of recovery which he shall havP ... " (R. 9fi), it
cannot he reasonably prersunwd tl1at a pri ,·ate contrad
could foreclosP rights statutorily grant.Pd
the legislah1r0 of thP stah•. (emphasis add,·d)
Ha\'ing eDn<'lnded, witlwut support, that defendant
is attempting to split his <'anse of art.ion, plaintiff doC'uments his position with strong authority. Hespondent
applauds the effort. In fact, there cannot here, lw a
splitting of the action. If State Farm s1ws thl' tortfeasor
upon the basis of its assignment from r0spondent, it
rnnst reimhnrsP the Htah' InsnrancP Fnnd for \V orkmen's Com1wnsation payments made to Barrett; if the
State Insurance Fund SUPS the tortfrasor npon the basis

of the camw of
aetion, it will lw reirnhurs<><l from the proceeds for \Vork11wn 's Com1wnsation payrnPnts made to Barrett. If one
of its statutoril>· granted
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rnes, the other cannot - bnt in
eYPnt, tlH• comrwnsation carrier will be reimbursed, and th<> tort t'easor will
bP subjected to onP snit only.
The horrifying vision of a ''raee to thP courthouse,"
which plaintiff conjures up seems the most
of
events in such cases as these, in view of t1H· fact that
defendant hPre settled ·with his insurer only after long
months of studied inaction hy th0 compensation carrier.
POINT III
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
WAS LAWFUL, PROPER, AND IN ACCORD WITH
THE FACTS.

8ection 35-1-20, U.C.A .. 1953, provides that:
"All orders of the commission within its jurisdiction shall be presumed reasonahle and lawful
nntil tl1ey are found otherwise in an action brought
for that purpose, or until altPrP<l or rt·\·oked by
the commission.''

Justice Ellett recently stated tl1e <>ffect of this statnte:
"Our statute provides that findings of fact
made by the Industrial Commission are
and final and not subject to rPvi.ew. \Ve have on
many occasions said that if there is substantial
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evidence to support the finding, we will not reverse. Ill orley v. l11dwdrial Crnnmission. 459 P.2d
:212 (19o9 Utah).
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the Industrial
Commission correctly determined that Barrett was entitled to receive \Vorkmen's Compensation benefits as
well as the proceeds from his contracted-for uninsured
motorist coverage; that plaintiff's right of subrogation
against the third-party tortfeasor is superior to that of
Barrett's insurer; that the Release and Trnst did not
negate plaintiff's right to bring suit against the thirdparty tortfeasor; and that Barrett "is entitled to be
compensated for his losses unclt•r the compensation act
notwithstanding any s0ttlrnwnt rearhed on th0 !nnin:,;nrNl motorist rovPrage l."

SUMMERHAYS, KLTNGLE
AND

Attorneys for Defendants and
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